If the first part of Kaplan’s book focuses its attention on the theoretic geopolitical models of the past, the second and third parts describe specific present-day international scenarios, exploring them through the pattern pointed out before.
The first chapter of Part 2 is
dedicated to the European Union. After proposing some general reflections over
the present status of the EU, Kaplan wishes to analyze more accurately the
influence of Asian invading hordes throughout European history, along a line of
continuity that binds the first Cimmerian invaders of the II millennium B.C. to
the final Mongolic ones of the XIII century A.D. Once again, the author
underlines the impact of climate and geography for Europe’s development and
rise. The landscape of the European continent abounds with mountains, forests,
productive fields, jagged shorelines and natural harbors and docks. The multiplicity
of European civilization and the variety of the peoples that here dwell hinge
upon the natural richness and diversity of the continent’s geography. Diversity,
dynamism and particularism have been the key words for the birth of a common
“idea of Europe”, which still holds the record of having bestowed the highest
contributions to world civilization. The notion of Europe as a sole political
unity, as the EU now pretends to be, dates back to the time of Charlemagne, the
founder of the Holy Roman Empire. After Charlemagne, other statesmen endeavored
to unify Europe into a single polity once again: the Hohenstaufen emperors,
emperor Charles V of Hapsburg, Louis XIV of France, Napoleon, Kaiser Wilhelm
and, ultimately, Adolf Hitler: shortly, all of them failed. The European integration
process, started with the Treaty of Paris (1951) and the Treaties of Rome
(1957), aims at a similar purpose: to forge a political unified Europe through
economic ties. Indeed, there are some resemblances between Charlemagne’s Europe
and the current EU; for instance, the present EU ruling regions stand where
once laid the core lands of the Frankish Holy Roman Empire of old: Burgundy,
Flanders, the Netherlands, the Rhineland, Alsace, Lotharingia, Lombardy and
Catalonia. Undoubtedly, in the contemporary EU the central, northern and
northwestern regions overlay supremacy over the southern (Mediterranean),
southeastern (Balkan) and eastern (Eastern European) ones. To be more precise,
within this general pattern Germany enjoys the status of hegemonic EU power.
Besides, the Balkan countries play a crucial role: first, it is towards these
regions, along with the others in Eastern Europe, that the European Union wills
to expand and to establish her control; then, the Balkan whole range is just
outside Mackinder’s Eurasian Heartland and lays right on top of Spykman’s
Rimland. In this context, the roles of Greece and of Turkish Eastern Thrace are
particularly significant.
The book then continues
speaking of Russia. Actually, Russia is to consider mainly as a land power. By
so being, she naturally expresses all of the uncertainties and insecurities
typical of land powers that are usually landlocked or semi-landlocked. Historically,
Russia was a semi-landlocked country until the XVIII century: in fact, as we
know, the Arctic Ocean froze during the winter and trades towards Europe or
Eastern Asia stopped. This geographical condition, as well as the need to
protect the frontiers, gave birth to Russian territorial expansionism. The imperatives
of Russian historical foreign policy were two: on one hand, that of defending
the steppes from the ever raids of the nomadic horse-riding Turkish-Mongolian tribes
(the continuous struggle between Cossacks and Tatars exemplifies the matter), and
on the other, that of seeking for warm waters from which carrying on trading
during wintertime. Interestingly, Kaplan believes to find the spring of both
tsarist autocracy and soviet totalitarianism in the climate and landscape of
the Russian country, showing once more how geographical determinism affects the
evolution of political systems. Summarizing Russian history, the author points
out the prominence of Ukraine, whose relevance is already contained in the name
she bares: “borderland”. The reason for Ukrainian past and present territorial crises
rely on the fact that this crammed flatland lays exactly in-between the
Eurasian Heartland and the European Rimland. Moreover, the author cites once
again the rivalry between tsarist Russia and the British Empire for the control
of Eurasia during the nineteenth century also known as “Great Game” or
“Tournament of Shadows”. The Russian strategic interest to reach the warm
waters could de facto threaten the
British communication lines with the Indian Raj and with the English areas of
influence in the Orient. As for the conquest of Siberia, her climate and
natural conditions implied the birth of a coercive and centralized kind of
government. The building of railways helped joining the vast Siberian widths,
though suggesting a sense of unsafety and insecurity typical of Russian
historical mentality. In Siberia, rivers play a relevant role: the Yenisei
splits Western from Eastern Siberia and the Lena Eastern Siberia from the
Russian Far East; meanwhile, the Ussuri forms the natural border between the
Russian Far East and Chinese Manchuria. The conquest of Siberia obliged Russia
to participate to the Pacific geopolitical contest, leading her to compete with
Japan, China and, later, the United States for the hegemony over the area:
think of the wars fought by tsarist Russia against Qing (Manchu) China or
against the Japanese Empire of the Rising Sun. When the Soviet Union replaced
imperial Russia, the Bolsheviks had to face the evidence that a land power
always suffers the threat of an attack on its outskirts: the gruesome years of
the civil war and of foreign interventionism (1918-23) reestablished the
difficulty of defending the Russian borders. Bolshevik imperialist realism was
able enough to consider moving the back the capital to Moscow rather than Saint
Petersburg, a core region from which the Eurasian control would be easier to
foster. Later, the United States perceived the birth of the great Soviet empire
onto the ashes of the shattered German Third Reich as the happening of
Mackinder’s prophecies on the control of the World-Island (i.e. Eurasia). Indeed,
after World War 2 appeared two main superpowers: on one side the USSR, that almost
encompassed the whole of Mackinder’s Heartland, and on the other the United
States of America, that embodied the perfect example of Mahan’s great sea
power. Since then, the Eurasian Rimland (including the Greater Middle East,
Western Europe and Southeastern Asia) would feel jeopardized both by the spread
of Soviet land power and by the pressure of American sea (and air) power. After
the USSR’s demise and the outburst of newly discovered nationalistic feelings
amongst the variegated former Soviet subjects, vulnerability was again Russia’s
keyword, deriving mainly from the unbalanced ratio between Russian demographic
rates and geographic extensions of the country. Things have changed now in
Eurasia. It seems to be that China is gaining always quicker a hegemonic role
on the Eurasian continent. So being things, should Russia focus her attention
more on the Eurasian Heartland or on her fringes like the European peninsula
and the Pacific Rim? What would Russia need to attract back to her former USSR
subjects? Unfortunately, Russia still needs to face the never-ending issue of
being, in fact, borderless. Furthermore, Ukraine plays a strategic role for the
relationships between the European Union and the Russian Federation: it is
throughout the Ukrainian flatland that superpowers currently confront each
other and within the present crisis, as foreseen by Brzezinski, Poland could
play a pivotal role, for better or for worse. Paradoxically, the Soviet
subdivision of Central Asia survived to the downfall of the USSR; despite
feeble political movements like pan-Turanianism or pan-Iranianism, Central
Asian republics are relatively stable though their ethnic composition does not
often coincide with the borders of the existing sovereign Turkestan States. For
instance, Kazakhstan, a significant portion of Mackinder’s Heartland, finally
returned to its native inhabitants. To conclude the chapter, the author dedicates some space to the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), described as a group of Eurasian
powers in anti-US fashion whose effectiveness over international politics is
still uncertain and in progress.
The chapter dedicated to China
opens with Mackinder’s view over this demographic and geographic giant. China
is even more threatening than Russia, because not only does the country possess
direct access to the Eurasian Heartland and its resources, but in addition to
this enjoys a strategic frontal position towards the Pacific Ocean: this makes
China a potential blend of land power and sea power and gives full meaning to
her Mandarin name of “Middle Kingdom”. Only now, is this double role of Chinese
power arising clearly and becoming a worrisome truth. The concept of Inner
Asia, including the lands of Manchuria, Mongolia, Eastern Turkestan and Tibet,
appears to be of fundamental geopolitical interest when considering the huge
Chinese landscape. In Eastern Turkestan dwell the Muslim Turkic Uighurs that have
been continuously struggling for secession from China, finding moral support in
other Turkic nations. In Inner Mongolia live the Mongols, unfairly separated by
their kinsmen of Outer Mongolia. In Tibet are the Lamaist Tibetans who still
oppose as they best can Beijing’s communist regime, attempting to call back
from his Indian exile the Dalai Lama.
Finally, Manchuria, a land from where the last Chinese imperial dynasty
originated (the Manchus), represents a border region that has been historically
claimed by Chinese, Russians and Japanese (think of the birth of the Japanese
puppet-State of Manchukuo in 1932). China still suffers in remembering her
dishonorable historical break up between the nineteenth and twentieth century,
when European powers snatched coercively Chinese territorial concessions, trade
deals and juridical capitulations, before the Japanese would start their own
continental expansion against China. Beijing conceives its international
affairs as a mean to avoid any new possible Chinese loss of sovereignty,
reflecting it on its relationships with Taiwan and Hong Kong. Indeed, Russia
has to fear the risk of a re-population of Eastern Siberia by Chinese pioneers
and settlers, considering that the demographic ratio between Russians and
Chinese in the Far East is completely unbalanced making future scenarios in the
area uncertain. Historically, the Nixon administration, with the aid of
Kissinger’s advice, took the advantage of both Brezhnev’s detent strategy
towards the US and of the Sino-Soviet split in order to open diplomatically to
communist China within the framework of a truly realistic strategy, devoid of
ideology and emotionality. China has been opposing the ethnical diversity
within her territory by colonizing the sensitive zone, say, Tibet or Xinjiang,
with ethnic Hans. However, the real grand strategy of a Greater China would
consist in penetrating Mackinder’s Eurasian Heartland. A Greater China implies
a Chinese preponderant over Afghanistan, Pakistan, Central Asia, Southeastern
Asia and the Chinese First Island Chain (which, going from north to south,
comprises Japan, the Ryuku Islands, the so-called half-island of the Korean Peninsula,
Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Australasia). As we can imagine, the
very idea of a Greater China, with her preponderant influence over almost half
of Asia, finds a natural rival in the parallel Indian rise. Evidently, the
rivalry between China and India will be a leitmotiv for the future
international internationals, among which the Dalai Lama’s exile issue is just
the tip of the iceberg, if not a mere casus
belli. Besides the enmity for Tibet, an Indo-Chinese “Great Game” is taking
place, embracing countries like Nepal and Bhutan (the two Himalayan buffer
States) on one side and Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka on the other. The
projection of sea power over the city-State of Singapore expresses a risk of a
Chinese dominion over the Indian and Pacific Oceans through the trade routes
that track the Strait of Malacca. The international relations in the Far East
cannot neglect the significant role that North Korea covers for being the pivot
of East Asia: the possible reunification of the Korean peninsula under a single
State could alter the entire balance of power in Eurasian Eastern Rim. As said
above, China is leading a double penetration both in Mackinder’s Heartland and in
Spykman’s Rimland: her new task consists in transforming a traditional
continental power into a mixed land-sea power. China is trying to absorb the
nature of sea power also by building a mighty fleet but still lacks of
self-confidence in rushing towards the oceanic challenge. Anyways, through its
projection of power over all Eastern Asia, Beijing is newly shaping the Western
Pacific’s geographic strategy and altering the balance of power of the region:
this could lead in the near future to the need for reconsidering the diplomatic
alignments and the strategic alliances for all actors here entangled.
As far as India is concerned,
Mahan and Spykman considered this country’s position as critical for being a
Rimland power naturally oriented towards the Middle East and China from her maritime
subcontinental position. As we have already seen, Eurasia consists of a
landmass, which encompasses the former USSR, and greatly populated fringes
(Europe, India, Indochina and China): amongst the latter, the Indian subcontinent
represents one of the most heavily populated and various from an ethnic,
linguistic and religious point of view. Mackinder found India’s vulnerability
on her northwestern frontier, from which historical invasions came crossing the
Khyber Pass. Describing India’s landscape, her mainland embodies two
geographical facts: it appears to be a standing-alone subcontinent on one side,
and a vibrant extremity of the Greater Middle East on the other. Moreover, from
a linguistic and ethnic point of view India appears to be as split into two
areas: the Indo-European north and the Dravidian south. Unlike China, India
grew as a democratic and pluralist political system thanks to the British rule
of yore, which commenced through the creation of small English footholds on the
Indian shores. Britain introduced in India the parliamentary mentality, the common-law
juridical system, the European administrative model and, of course, the English
language. Thanks to British-built railways, the English governors managed for
the first time in history to unite the Indian subcontinent into a single
polity. Besides, the countries that neighbor India present a lack of
geographical coherence. Pakistan was hastily born in 1947 for unraveling the Indian
Muslims from the Hindu majority. Bangladesh was born in 1971, seceding from
Pakistan for political reasons. Nepal and Bhutan symbolize two buffer states
between India and China. The Afghan borders descend from the Russo-British
imperial rivalry in Central Asia (think of the Wakhan Corridor, that currently
separates Tajikistan from Pakistan, conceived to keep a bumper zone between the
Russian and the British empires). Indeed, Afghanistan holds a strategic
position for being a buffer between the Iranian Plateau, the Central Asian steppes
and the Indian Subcontinent; verily, it is the crossroad of the entire Asian
continent. Today, the Eurasian Heartland is vast landscape where the interests
of Russia, China, India and Iran intertwine and where the Central Asian strips,
including Afghanistan, play a major role. A stable Afghanistan could become the
hub of Eurasia, and all nearby countries would benefit from that. Actually,
after the Greater Middle East region, the Greater Indian subcontinent
represents one of the least stable geopolitical areas in the world. One of the
reason for the somewhat tarnished relations between India and China relies on
the fact that the Chinese regime upholds military and political support to
India’s regional rivals, significantly Pakistan: India feels somehow surrounded
by China. The issue of Kashmir, a land partitioned between Pakistan, India and
China, keeps the tensions high amongst them.
For what concerns the Middle
East, this pan-region represents a vast quadrilateral where Europe, Russia,
Asia and Africa intersect: with the Mediterranean Sea and the Sahara Desert to
the west; the Black sea, the Caucasus, the Caspian Sea, and the Central Asian
steppe-land to the north; the Hindu Kush and the Indian Subcontinent to the
east; and the Indian Ocean to the south. One of its main distinguishing
features is that it lacks of a single State that has hegemony over the area. In
fact, which country should gain the rule of the Middle East? Turkey has a vast
population, but is not Arabic. Iran has a vast population too, but it neither
Arabic nor Sunni. Saudi Arabia controls the Holy Shrines of Mecca and Medina,
but has a small population. Egypt has a large population, but its African
location turns it away from the Asian Near East. The weakness of all the Middle
East depends on the lack of unity among its countries. Pan-Arabism once
embraced the idea of unification of all Arab nations, but even if it had
reached the goal, countries like Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan would
have stayed out from the union. Within the Middle East, there are three main
ethnic strains: the Arab, the Iranian, and the Turkic: each of them declare its
respective superiority over the others. The Arabic Islamic world divides in
three parts: the Maghreb (Northern Africa), the Mashreq (the Near East) and the
Khalij (the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf). All of the Mashreq is
instable mainly due to European colonization (keep in mind the British and
French mandates over the former Ottoman Near East after World War 1) on one
hand and the presence of the Zionist State of Israel on the other. Furthermore,
Wahhabism influences greatly the Saudi Arabian view of politics and religion.
Its fanatical interpretation of the Quran originated from the central Arabic
region of Najd where the society’s backbone consisted in camel-based nomadism;
thus, Najd represents the core of Wahhabi rule and Saudi sovereignty. As for
Iran, it embodies the Middle Eastern universal juncture, just as the Middle East
incarnates the quadrilateral of the World-Island (Eurafrasia). Can Iran become
a new geographical pivot despite its reactionary theocracy and its nuclear
enrichment program? Though Iran is much smaller than India and China, or Russia
or Europe for the matter, it is merely because it is in possession of the key
geography of the Middle East in terms of position, population and energy
resources that is fundamental to global geopolitics. Indeed, the originality of
the Iranian revolution of 1979 lies in the alliance between the clergy and the
Islamist intelligentsia. The Iranian state has been stronger and better
organized than any others in the greater Middle East, save for turkey and
Israel, and the Islamic Revolution did not dismantle the Iranian State, but,
rather, attached itself to it. It is also true that the somewhat suffocating
Shiite clergy of Iran dispirits an allure of Central Asian, Caucasian or
Arabian Muslims towards the country. In addition, Iraq’s destiny is deeply
dependent on that of Iran, being a country that hosts a numerous number of
Shiite Muslims. Undoubtedly, for better or for worse, Iran will affect the
Eurasian future fate. Also, what to say about Turkey? Turkey’s geographical
nature is that of a natural land bridge, or almost of an island: it links the
Middle Eastern core land with the southeastern European gate. In being one of
the most secular and open-minded nations among the Islamic world, Turkey has
the opportunity, due to her Kemalist past, to interact effectively with the
European nations and the West. Although the current Turkish leadership seems to
yield somehow from the Kemalist laicism, the overall positive condition of
Turks, the concrete respect for human rights and the membership within NATO
make Turkey a good interlocutor for the US, and who knows if this Islamic
overpopulated republic will one day join the EU. For sure, Turkey still
projects a relevant shadow-power both in the Balkans and in Caucasia, and
stands as a gifted opponent to Iranian hegemony over the Muslim world.
Finally, Kaplan dedicates Part
3 of his book to the Americas, particularly North America. Mackinder calls the
outlying area that includes the Americas the Outer Crescent in order to
differentiate it from the Marginal Crescent or Rimland. As we already know, the
entire North American continent comprises the most crucial of the continental
satellites around the World-Island and a land from which sea power and air
power projects over the Marginal Crescent. Kaplan introduces here some
thought-provoking ideas. He highlights that the United States, having dropped
down the material barriers towards the Canadian border, stay vulnerable in
their southeastern frontier with Mexico. The US own an Anglo-Protestant
backbone that the Hispanic Catholic immigration from Mexico may put at stake in
the future. American Protestantism closely aligns with nationalism; it helped
releasing a typical American mentality based upon dissent, individualism,
republicanism and patriotism. This entire scale of values, as well as the white
race predominance, is endangered by the risk of a Mexican “Reconquista” of the
American southeastern States due to the surprising demographic augmentation of
Hispanic individuals and to a difficult containment of illegal immigration from
Mexico. Now, Kaplan’s suggestion is very simple and smart: he asks why the US
government should worry so much of starting expensive wars in far lands like
Afghanistan, entangling in extremely complicated crises and circumstances, when
it would be so more useful to fix the problems on the southern border. In other
words, the United States of America should care less of foreign countries that
lay out of their territorial range and should instead focus the attention on
its own mainland. Not only would this political strategy bring closer the
public opinion of all those extra-American countries where the US somehow intervened,
but also it would utterly mean to uphold the very American-born Monroe
Doctrine.
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