The Treaty of Lisbon and the common European defense policy

The Treaty of Lisbon of 2007, officially entered into force in 2009, has introduced significant innovations in relation to the European system of defense and security.

The desire to create an active cooperation regarding defense and security amongst European countries has ancient roots and has gone through ups and downs. In 1952 was expressed the desire to create the European Defense Community (EDC), which provided for the creation of a joint European army under the command of NATO. However, two years later the EDC project was rejected because of the opposition expressed by France. Meanwhile, in 1954, Italy and Western Germany joined the Treaty of Brussels of 1948, giving birth to an international organization that guaranteed political and defense cooperation known as Western European Union (WEU). Thus, this organization included France, Great Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy and Western Germany. At the same time, the cooperation to coordinate European foreign affairs was also evolving, through the birth of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in 1970. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), which truly established the ultimate European Union, the EPC turned into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), entitled to express herself through common actions and common positions. Likewise, in 1992, the Petersberg Declaration founded the so-called “Petersberg tasks”, that is military operations carried out jointly by the EU and NATO. The next step, in 1996, saw the supreme military command of NATO accepting that European officers within NATO could cover leadership roles in the WEU: the proclamation of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) confirmed it. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) established the possibility to undertake even of Petersberg tasks within the WEU. Between 1998 and 1999, the European cooperation project for defense reached a turning point. In fact, in 1998, policymakers began to speak about a Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), which saw the birth in 1999 when NATO had decided to adopt a new strategic concept to counter the future threats to world peace and security. Moreover, in 1999, the European Council of Helsinki stated that Europe was willing to continue to foster an active partnership with NATO in the field of security policy. With the gradual decline of the WEU, in the year 2000 the Petersberg tasks were included within the EU. Since 2002, the EU started her missions. The first civil mission, placed under the aegis of the United Nations, was that in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2003, the first EU military mission without NATO involvement occurred in Congo. Again, in 2005, a following civil-military mission in Congo took place, and in 2008, the first naval military mission in Somalia. Between 2002 and 2003, three important changes were introduced: the conclusion of the “Berlin Plus” arrangements, through which the EU could use NATO facilities for joint missions (2002); the adoption of a new European Security Strategy (ESS; 2003); the birth of the European Defense Agency (EDA; 2004). Henceforward, the changes framed by the Treaty of Lisbon were introduced upon this dynamical background.

Flag of the Western European Union

The Treaty on the European Union (TEU), as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon, and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) announced significant modifications in the European defensive system. Firstly, the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is comprised within the CFSP and uses both civil and military tools to achieve its goals: this means that it is empowered to set out civil and military missions. It is also reaffirmed the relevance of the EDA, a CFSP body, that contemplates summits amongst the Defense Ministers of the EU member States for a starker cooperation. The Treaty of Lisbon states that the bodies entitled to implement the CFSP are the European Council, the Council of the European Union, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the member States (the European Commission and the European Parliament play a minor role in this subject). Accordingly, the decisions regarding the CSDP are approved by the Council of the EU on a proposal of the High Representative or of a member State: these decisions must be sanctioned unanimously and the abstention of a member shall not preclude the adoption of the decision (i.e. the “constructive abstention”). Once the decisions are approved, the Council of the EU entrusts the missions to a group of member States. Secondly, another novelty introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon is the clear statement that if third States attack one or more EU States, all EU members will intervene to support the attacked member in accordance with what article 51 of the UN Charter alleges: therefore, in this day and age the EU truly embodies the example of a defensive alliance (i.e. “mutual defense clause”). Likewise, the Petersberg tasks are improved through a closer strategic relationship between the EU and NATO. A solidarity clause has been introduced, that vouches for a joint effort in dealing with threats like terrorist attacks or natural calamities. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon ensures a reinforced cooperation in all fields of the CFSP and CSDP, structuring it in permanent and fixed bodies.

The EUMS and NATO's IMS gathering in Brussels in 2014  

The main institutional bodies entrusted to pursue the CSDP are three, sided by several minor ones.  One of the most relevant is the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), which provides summits amongst the Chiefs of Staff of the EU States and aims at sponsoring the military cooperation, preventing the break out of conflicts, outlining the military strategies, etc. Another body is the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) entitled to raise in due time the alarm on the outbreak of a crisis, to evaluate the sensitive areas, to plan the military strategies, etc. The third main body is the European Defense Agency (EDA), which gathers the Defense Ministers of the EU States and is headed by the High Representative, who, according to the Treaty of Lisbon, also holds the office of Vice-president of the European Commission (one of many) and of European Commissioner for External Relations.                                      

The main threats for European defense and security, as the European strategy papers reveal, are international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the conflicts in neighboring regions, the organized crime and the natural or human calamities. Bearing in mind these challenges, the European strategies underscore the active role that the EU is called to play in sensitive bordering areas like the Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East and Northern Africa and the necessity that the EU will endeavor a close cooperation with other international organizations like the UN, NATO and the OSCE, as well with influent States like China, Russia, India, Brazil, etc.     

The EULEX Headquarters in Prishtina, Kosovo  

The EU military missions can be of two kinds: autonomous military missions and joint military missions with NATO according to the “Berlin Plus” agreements. In the former case, the management and control of the operations is usually entrusted to a framework nation that has a major influence in the area of the crisis (this was the case of France in the mission in Congo of 2005), otherwise the European Union Operations Center (EUOC) will decide. In the latter case, the command of the mission is devolved to NATO and the EU will be entitled to use its logistic facilities.

Up to today, the EU missions were of four types: 1) military operations (e.g. Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo); 2) civil missions (e.g. EULEX in Kosovo); 3) civil-military missions (e.g. EU SSR in Guinea-Bissau); 4) joint EU-NATO missions (e.g. EUFOR Althea in Bosnia-Herzegovina).                           

With regard to the funding, the civil missions are supported by the EU’s ordinary budget, whereas the military ones by the specific member States involved.

  

References: 

Howorth, J., Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, 2007.

Keukeleire, S., and MacNaughtan, J., The Foreign Policy of the European Union, 2008.   

                       

Italo-Russian relationships: a history lasting more than six centuries

The historical and diplomatic relations between Italy and Russia are indeed very ancient, dating back at least six hundred years. At the present time, Italy is the second Russian commercial partner after Germany within the European Union. Italian diplomacy is particularly active in the Russian Federation through the Italian embassy in Moscow, some general consulates in Ekaterinburg and Kaliningrad, some further branches of the embassy in cities like Samara and Volgograd, and many lesser consulates throughout the country. The Italian chamber of commerce and trade unrolls a prominent part in stimulating economic exchanges and bilateral investments. Both Russia and Italy are member States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and of the Council of Europe. Italy strongly relies on the importation of Russian gas and accordingly significant agreements have been signed between the Italian ENI agency and the Russian Gazprom. Indeed a vast portion of Italy’s GDP comes from Russian tourism, investments and exports of goods and services towards the Russian Federation.

In the fifteenth-sixteenth centuries, during the rule of Ivan III of Muscovy, several Italian architects and artists were invited to Moscow to draw and build the churches of the Kremlin. Amongst them were Aristotele Fioravanti, Antonio Gilardi/Anton Fryazin, Marco Ruffo/Marco Fryazin, Pietro Antonio Solari/Pёtr Fryazin, and so forth. The word fryazin (Фрязин) is an ancient Russian word that indicates a “foreigner”, or more specifically an “Italian” or “Genoese” (cf. the Russian city of Fryazino in Moscow’s oblast’).

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Russian empire strengthened its ties with several Italian States and polities, especially with the Republic of Venice. It is remarkable to highlight that in 1711 the first Russian consulate in the Italian peninsula was founded in Venice, and chronographically it was the world’s second after that of Amsterdam.

Throughout the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars it is well known that czarist Russia aided the Italian kingdoms and republics against the French invaders, and it would be perhaps superfluous to recall here general Suvorov’s military campaign of 1799.

After the Congress of Vienna and the Restauration (1814-15) the Russian autocracy longed to preserve the European status quo and to dishearten the outburst of liberal and democratic revolutions in the Italian peninsula.

Later, during the Crimean war (1853-56), the kingdom of Sardinia-Piedmont, which would have then turned into the unifying State of Italy, fought along with the British-French-Turkish coalition in order to gain attractiveness amongst European countries and to expose in the following peace conference, which would have taken place in Paris in 1856, Italy’s problems, especially those related to the unification.

Nevertheless, after the Italian unification (1861) the Russian empire speedily recognized the newly born kingdom of Italy in 1862 by sending diplomatic representation and by entwining economic relations and trade exchanges. Perhaps this might be considered weird if thinking that the birth of the Italian State had been largely due to liberal and masonic devices and that the Russian tsardom was wholly adverse to liberalism.  

Afterwards, during World War One Italy and Russia fought on the same side, backing the United Kingdom and France within the Triple Entente against Germany, Austria-Hungary and Turkey. Nonetheless, when the Bolshevik party gained power over Russia in 1917, unlike other Western countries, Italy kept some relatively good relations with Bolshevik Russia first and the Soviet Union later. As a matter of fact, in 1924 the Italian prime minister Benito Mussolini decided to recognize the USSR. However, during World War Two Fascist Italy joined Nazi Germany in the invasion of the Soviet Union (Operation “Barbarossa”) in 1941. Despite the overall mistake of the entire operation, Italian soldiers treated Russian civilians with kindness and dignity unlike other members of the invading coalition. In 1944, when the war was finally reaching an end, Stalin recognized Italy when the country had had already overthrown the Fascist government and was de facto fighting on the Allies’ side.

During the Cold War the Italian relations with the Soviet Union were intense and passionate besides the Italian strategic alignment with the NATO countries. It is noteworthy to highlight that the Italian communist party (PCI) was in fact the strongest in Western Europe in terms of activism and electoral body. An example of the solid mutual esteem between Russians and Italians in that period may be the following: in 1946 the Soviets changed the name of Stavropol’-na-Volge into Togliatti, which was the surname of the general secretary of the Italian communist party, and began building there a great factory for the construction of FIAT cars.

Finally, after the dissolution of the USSR in 1991 Italy recognized the Russian Federation as the successor of the former superpower. Between 1994 and 2003 huge amounts of agreements had been signed between the two countries. In 2002 the Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi wished to craft a more powerful dialogue among NATO countries and Russia hosting a general summit at Pratica di Mare, not far from Rome (for insights see also NATO’s new strategic concept). Berlusconi’s Italy meant to become a kind of bridge between the US and Russia. Rather naively, the Italian prime minister even suggested that Russia could join the EU! Anyways, important agreements were concluded for gas furniture (think of the Blue Stream and the South Stream projects). Later Italian PM Gianni Letta participated to the opening ceremony of the Winter Olympic Games of 2014 held in Sochi, unlike many other Western leaders.

In terms of economic relations, as already mentioned, Italy is the second Russian commercial partner within the EU, the fourth of the world and the seventh importer. The bilateral trade of the countries was worth 22 billion dollars in 2010 and 27.4 billion dollars in 2011 (in just one-year time the commercial growth raised up to 21.4%). At the same time, Italian exports towards Russia in 2011 were worth 9.3 billion dollars (some 17.8% more than in 2010). There are more than 500 Italian enterprises in Russia also due to the fresh Russian adhesion to the World Trade Organization. Moreover, Russia is the main energetic exporter in Italy: the oil import reaches 15% of the total and the gas import 30%.

Unfortunately, after the break out of the Ukrainian crisis, in 2014 Matteo Renzi’s government introduced economic sanctions against Russia following the EU guidelines. Since then the results have been disastrous: Russia answered to the sanctions by imposing a stark embargo that led to the crack of production and to a severe recession for many Italian enterprises in different fields: gastronomy, fashion, tourism, services, etc. Yet we must strongly underline that there has been a tough opposition in Italy to EU’s decisions to sanction Russia, especially among the enterprisers, the touristic agents, the shop owners, and so forth. It is also decisively to highlight that PM Renzi was not elected through democratic and constitutional elections but merely nominated by the President of the Republic Giorgio Napolitano, who is often considered to be a puppet in Brussel’s and Merkel’s hands.

What we would like to add here is that after almost a year of sanctions against Russia Italy is undoubtedly in a far worse position than before and nothing positive occurred in terms of economic growth and stability: on the contrary, recession is ever rising and many enterprises, especially in the Northern part of the country, shut down their activities. Did sanctioning Russia bring to a positive outcome? Not at all if we consider that the Ukrainian crisis has not been solved yet and that Italy’s reputation towards an ever friendly State like Russia is now partially tarnished. It seems utterly senseless for Italy to sanction one of her main economic partners just to satisfy the blind will of the European Union, in many ways contrary, all the time, to Italian national interests.                                                                                               

The end of the unipolar world and the beginning of the pan-regional world

The beginning of the twenty-first century, inaugurated with the terrorist attacks of 9/11 against the United States mainland, marked a milestone in forging a new order, or system, amongst international relations. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union back in 1991 the world was hegemonized by the only superpower that could still be considered as the victor over all other rivals and enemies throughout the twentieth century, the United States. However this planetary hegemony, which implied the right for this country to intervene, either directly or indirectly, in political crises in almost any other country worldwide along with the partners of the Atlantic Alliance, declined in the last fifteen years and it is not utopian to believe that its fate will be that of disappearing within few decades. The reasons of the decline and presumable final fall of the American “empire” is to be found in many causes, but the main cause is perhaps the emerging of new economies, countries and powers. Globalization implied benefits in linking together different peoples and nations, however it also made it possible for underdeveloped or medium-developed countries to gain the skills to emulate and ultimately overtake the developed ones, mainly the USA and the member States of the EU. What the international community is facing today is a shift of power from old holders to newly arrived actors, which once and for all decided to raise up their heads.

Shift of powers in anti-American, or, best to say, in anti-Western key are emerging somehow in all places. First of all in the Islamic world integralist groups and organisations are decided to accomplish the great plan that the first Muslims close to the Prophet Muhammad considered fundamental to accomplish, to free the lands upon which Islam desired control from the dominion of infidels. The Islamic community, especially the Arab nations that embrace Islam, know well their history and can see that the Islamic world was obliged to hold a defensive position facing the “Christian” nations since the decline of the Ottoman empire. Arabs feel as they are the great losers of the present world order, having suffered under the colonization of European States, having lost at the time of their independence the opportunity of forming a pan-Arabian State and most of all having been humiliated by the Zionist movement with the creation, in the heart of the Islamic world, of the State of Israel. If we focus on the so called terroristic organizations we can realize that after all they are fighting a defensive war against infidel intruders or against puppet governments that support infidel States and powers. The reason of the proliferation of jihadist  movements is that Islam, the real and integral one, feels that the showdown against its enemies is near and that sooner or later a shift of power will occur from the Western liberal “atheist” democracies to purer and God-fearing political organizations. The strength of Muslim faith relies today mainly in the demographic factor, which makes Islamic countries some of the most populous of the world, and in the strong immigration of Muslim people especially within Western countries in which integralists could act as fifth columns.

Secondly, we can perceive a shift of power in Eurasia, where new countries are combining their strength to counterbalance Western hegemony. First of all, once ending the humbling age of Eltsin, Putin’s Russia has raised up its head and is willing to gain the leadership of the Eurasian continent in the next decades. Russia indeed has everything: natural resources of all kinds, enormous land,  sufficient manpower and the strategic position of being a natural connection for the Western and the Eastern world. Russian lands begin in Europe and end in the Pacific Ocean and Russian national interests cover all continents. It is possible to admit that we are living a continuation of the “Great Game” that the Russian empire and the British one fought throughout Eurasia in the nineteenth century, although nowadays the Russian rivals of the game are the United States on one side and the European Union on the other. But Russia is not fighting alone for hegemony in Eurasia: China is her best partner in the pursue of creating this shift of power, realizing that a partnership with Russia is a safe way to obtain a long-term furniture of key natural resources, mandatory for an ever growing economy and population. While the European Union, with Washington’s support, is trying to extend more and more its influence over nations which traditionally were under Russian or Soviet influence (Ukraine, the Baltic area, the Balkans, the Caucasus), Russia is answering trying to confirm once again that these areas are under her control. As we could see in the past years this contraposition between EU and Russia brought to the break out of regional conflicts in several “border” areas: Kosovo, Georgia, Ukraine, etc. It is foreseeable that the victor for hegemony over Eurasia will be Russia, and this is due to the fact of its inner strength and autonomy, to the clear weakness of the EU and skepticism towards her amongst her very citizens, to the key alliance with strong actors like China and less strong but still regionally important like Kazakhstan, Belarus, Serbia, etc.

Moreover, we can see that a shift of political power implies also a shift of economic one. How can it be that the strongest economy of the world, the American, is also the most highly indebted? A country cannot base its existence on ever growing public debt. On the contrary, other countries like China prefer to count on economic savings and sustaining of foreign sovereign debts. New economies are growing faster than expected: Russia, China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Iran. The developing of these so called BRIC countries will clearly imply a resizing of the American economic might: this could lead to the end of the role of the US dollar as main currency used for economic transactions and to the obsolescence of the international financial institutions headed by American capitals (World Bank, International Monetary Fund) which may be soon substituted with others entirely funded by BRIC economies.

In conclusion we can say that international relations are facing a real revolution. The decline of the unipolar world hegemonized by the United States and its NATO allies seems to be not only possible, but already a concrete matter of fact. It is clear enough that our world is running faster and faster towards a multipolar community in which strong or medium powers are gaining a regional control, or best to say a pan-regional control, on which they can act as only leaders. In other words Haushofer’s geopolitical vision is closer today than ever, but if at his time the plan failed for the results of the second world war, today no superpower is sufficiently strong for avoiding its success.