In
his book Post-Western World. How Emerging
Powers are Remaking Global Order, Oliver Stuenkel introduces some
innovative arguments regarding the future of world politics from a quite uncommon
perspective for Western mainstream analyses. The chief thesis of the research
claims that the understanding of the creation of today’s international order is
limited, since it depicts a post-Western world from a closed-minded
Western-centric standpoint. In this context, non-Western actors are barely
perceived as constructive rule-makers and institution-builders, because the
West is widely conceived as the sole actor entitled to enhance the norms by
which the international system is disciplined. However, Stuenkel suggests that
the study of the future’s world order needs to undertake the inevitability of a
bipolarization between the United States and China or even of a
multipolarization due to the emerging of the BRICS countries. The end of the
unipolar world – which represents a historical fact – implies a more
overarching international analysis that overcomes the traditional
Western-centric perspective and a more balanced reading of the distribution of
global power. The chief aim of Stuenkel’s work is to show on one hand that most
observers – both Western and anti-Western – tend to exaggerate the role the
West has played in the past and, on the other, to discuss on how to adapt to a
multipolar world order.
The
book is organized in six chapters. The first chapter considers the origins of
Western-centrism from a historical outlook. Specifically, it describes the
nature of global order prior to the rise of the West, claiming that an
international order was already in place before; it analyzes how Europe began
to advance and rapidly overcome other actors starting from the 16th
century, ultimately dominating the world four centuries later; and it evaluates
how Europeans – and Westerners in general – believe that Westernization and
modernization are synonyms.
The
second chapter deals with the rise of the rest and with the likely end of the
unipolar system. The principal statement here is that in the coming decades the
world will face a condition of “asymmetric bipolarity” in which the United
States will keep their leading position in terms of military power, whereas
China will embody the world’s first economy. Nevertheless, the author questions
whether this kind of bipolar system will be peaceful, durable and stable, but
he also rejects the idea – often shared in the West – that the imminent
post-unipolar world will be necessarily chaotic and instable. The third chapter
examines soft power. After highlighting that soft power uses attraction and
persuasion rather than force and coercion in foreign policy, and that its allure
relies on a country’s culture, political ideals and policies, the author states
that emerging powers are seeking to transform hard power into soft power by
implementing three key areas: cultural diplomacy, international legitimacy/agenda-setting
capacity, and attraction of each society.
The
fourth and fifth chapters illustrate the main international initiatives and
institutions proposed by non-Western countries – particularly China – aimed at
crafting a parallel global order. These institutions and international regimes
are divided into several sectors: finance, trade and investment, security,
diplomacy, and infrastructure. The finance sector includes the analysis of the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the BRICS-led New Development Bank
(NDB), the BRICS Contingency Reserve Agreement (CRA), the global infrastructure
to internationalize the yuan, China International payment system (CIPS), China
Union Pay, the Shanghai Global Financial Center (GFC), the Universal Credit Rating
Group, the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateral (CMIM), the ASEAN+3, and the
ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO). The trade and investment sector
analyzes the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Free
Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP). The security sector deals with the
Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the BRICS national security
advisors (NSA) meeting. The diplomacy sector includes the BRICS Leaders
Summits, the BRICS and IBSA working groups, and the Boao Forum for Asia (BFA).
Finally, the infrastructure sector introduces the projects of the Silk Road
Fund/One Road-One Belt (OBOR), the Nicaragua Canal, and the Trans-Amazonian Railway.
Finally,
the sixth chapter draws some conclusions on the coming post-Western world. A
key thesis by the author is that non-Western actors do not seek to undermine
Western institutions and create a new world order, but rather they wish to
forge parallel institutions that emulate Western leadership. Moreover, emerging
powers do not question the foundations of Western liberal order, and agree with
issues such as international institutions, cooperative security, democratic
community, collective problem solving, shared sovereignty, and the rule of law:
in fact, all these elements are necessary for rising powers to develop
economically.
The
key arguments of the book are the following. First, a Western-centric worldview
leads to underestimate the role of non-Western actors have played in the past
and play in contemporary international politics, but also the constructive role
they are likely to play in the future. The book argues that a post-Western
order will not necessarily be more violent than today’s global order.
Second,
the economic rise of the rest, specifically China, will allow it to enhance its
military capacity and it will inevitably entail an increase of its
international influence and soft power – since soft power is easy to generate
from a large hard power base.
Third,
emerging powers are crafting a parallel international order, with several
institutions and international regimes that represent an alternative to
Western-led ones. The book argues that, rather than directly confronting
existing institutions, rising powers – primarily China – are quietly building a
parallel global order that will initially complement today’s international
institutions.
Finally,
the creation of new parallel institutions is the main strategy that non-Western
actors use to better project their power. This alternative order is already in
the making, but its structures do not emerge because China and others bear new
ideas on how to address global challenges, but rather they create them to
project their power, emulating what the West has already done before. The book
claims that, as part of a heading strategy, China-led emerging powers will
continue to invest in existing institutions and embrace most elements of
today’s “liberal hierarchical order”, but they will seek to obtain the
“hegemonic principles” so far only enjoyed by the United States. The creation
of several China-centric institutions will allow China to embrace its own type
of competitive multilateralism, picking and choosing among flexible frameworks,
in accordance with its national interests, thus slowly institutionalizing its
own exceptionalism and enhancing its policies autonomously by becoming
increasingly immune to Western threats of exclusion.
In conclusion, Oliver Stuenkel depicts an
interesting future scenario by using lenses that see beyond Western-centric
rhetoric, giving for granted the rise of a post-unipolar – and thus
post-Western – global order. Being a Brazilian scholar – therefore a citizen of
one of the BRICS –, the author points out a very detailed analysis of the main
issues that emerging powers will have to deal with, which are often
miscalculated in Western academic and intellectual environments. Overall, his
book is a valuable and appreciable tool to understand the perception that the
non-Western world has of itself and of the West, and, mostly, a useful guide
for the West to not overestimate itself and underestimate the rest. References:
O. Stuenkel, Post-Western World. How Emerging Powers are Remaking Global Order, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016.
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