Immanuel Kant and the critique of reason of state

In his 1795 pamphlet entitled "Perpetual Peace. A Philosophical Sketch" (“Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf”),[1] Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) believed he had found antidotes to international wars exposing them in a philosophical-political program that had for ultimate goal the establishment of a global confederation. In the opinion of the great philosopher of Königsberg, the creation of a worldwide confederation of nations would have forever averted war. At the end of the essay, under the appendix heading "On the discrepancy between morality and politics towards perpetual peace", he lists three political strategies – or, in Kant's words, "sophistical standards". Kant believed that these strategies followed the rules of a ruthless Machiavellian reason of state that eventually did not allow the achievement of a clear and transparent international coexistence, threatening the occurrence of general peace. The stratagems are the following: 

1) Fac et excusa: It is convenient to seize the favorable opportunity for an arbitrary taking of possession both of a right of the State over its own people and of a right over another neighboring folk. Through a “fait accompli”, the justification would occur much easier and violence would be masked with greater happiness than in the case of looking for pervious convincing reasons and waiting for the objections of the counterpart.

2) Si fecisti, nega: It is opportune to deny the proper blame for all things that happened and occurred, arguing that the blame is to find in other persons or forces.

3) Divide et impera: For Kant, this principle could have two aspect. The internal aspect within the State occurs when strategists try to divide the leaders of the people, and bringing them into conflict with the people in order to gain their own legitimacy to become rulers. The external aspect within the foreign relations considers the production of international crises and discords led to the appearance of a joyful third actor that benefits from the rivals’ divisions and can carry forward the gradual subjugation of other States under the guise of an assistance to the weakest.

Kant describes the reason of state as the will of the great powers deriving from the increase of their power regardless of the manner through which this growth was achieved.

Like many other philosophers, Kant investigates the issues that descend from the traditional and endless difficulty given by the relation between ethics and politics. His philosophical conclusion is that politics should be subordinated to ethics and that there should be no substantial distinction between the moral sphere and the political one. Morality consists, in Kantian terms, in the set of unconditionally imperative laws, and thus governors must rule according to morality itself, lest they be unlawful. It is therefore impossible to rule ignoring moral unconditionally imperative norms, and who does it exchanges ethics – made of categorical imperatives – with a particularistic prudential doctrine based on hypothetical imperatives aimed at the pursue of several goals for the purpose of personal utility. Indeed, Kant rejects utilitarian morality, which is closely linked to the Machiavellian and post-Machiavellian interpretation of reason of state conceived as the doctrine by which the end justifies the means.

Kant distinguishes the “political moralist” from the “moral politician”: the former, who he disapproves, forges his own morality aligning it with national interest, whereas the latter, who he supports, interprets politics in the light of imperative moral norms, so that it may coexist with ethics in a non-conflictual way. The moral politician is the one who represents the ideal incarnation of the “good politician”, whose ultimate aim is the creation of a universal union of states through the birth of a juridical community that takes the form of a global confederation.

It follows that the sovereigns should behave and rule morally, that is obeying at the imperative and supreme moral axiom according to which the human person should never be considered as a mean.

The ethics of virtue and the ethics of might are always incompatible: only the adoption of the ethics of virtue by the governors will be capable of putting an end to the perpetual state of war, whose sole result would be, in Kant’s words, the cemetery of humankind.                               

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[1] Kant, I. (1972). Perpetual peace. New York: Garland Pub.

The role of reason of state in international relations

The building of the international system based upon stability through realism does not always follow ethical rules: instead, it often happens that cynicism plays a decisive role.

One of the greatest expressions of the philosophical concept of cynicism is that named after “reason of state”.  That of the reason of state is a statolatric vision that considers the political power of a country and the supreme interests of the sovereign as propeller engines for political action and a source of inspiration for strategies. The philosophical paradigm upon which the theory of reason of state rests upon is the idea that any political action exercised by the state, if it is necessary for the sake of the state itself, is legitimate despite its lack of morality.

Specifically, the reason of state consists in the pursuit of the national interest of states, which implies the fulfillment of their economic, cultural, strategic and geopolitical goals and ambitions, as well as the accomplishment of their specific “historical mission”. The pursuit of national interest is one of the main distinguishing features of the realist doctrine of international relations. The national interest aims primarily at granting the survival and the safety of the state, and at augmenting its welfare, economic growth and powerfullness.

Generally, the reason of state is invoked to justify a state or governmental action – which is often kept secret – directed at avoiding the break out of wars, revolutions or political events that may put at stake the existence and survival of the state. In the majority of cases, the reason of state takes the appearance of a state secret, because it carries out an action contrary to several interests or ideals of the state, of its allies and of its citizens in order to avert the occurrence of worse consequences for them. The action veiled with the state secret is often of violent or coercive fashion, often taking the form of a sacrifice of a smaller good so to achieve a greater good (or the choice of a smaller evil so to avoid a greater one).

The first theorizer of the theory of the reason of state was the Italian political-philosopher Giovanni Botero (1544-1617), expressing it in his essay “Della ragion di Stato” (1589).[1] Although Botero’s methodology and purposes may somewhat recall Machiavelli’s ones, actually many differences occur between the two. In fact, Botero considers the state as an absolute and stable dominion over the subjects, and the reason of state is nothing more than the set of necessary and appropriate means and expediencies through which exercise and preserve this very dominion. Botero will also add that the reason of state theorized by Machiavelli is untruthful and wicked, because the Prince should exercise his power respecting and supporting the religious and moral precepts.

Unlike Botero, the other Italian political-philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) expressed in his essay “Il Principe” (1513) a different view of the notion of reason of state.[2] The chief idea tha Machiavelli endorses is that government is an art inspired solely by mere utilitarianism and that the prince, i.e. the governor, is entitled to rule using any expedient, even the most immoral and gruesome, in order to reach his aims, which ultimately converge into the pursue of the well-being and might of the state.

The main difference between Botero’s and Machiavelli’s thought consists in the impact given to morality and religion as tools for government. Machiavelli believes that the governor ought to use the reason of state careless of any moral or religious implication for the sake of the state’s grandeur. Instead, Botero assumes that the use of the reason of state by the governor should be moderated by the application of virtues like morality and justice and by the respect for religion: otherwise, the governor would lack of reputation and obedience among his subjects.

Although some theories of international relations believe that the international order relies on idealistic and somewhat naïve principles, it is difficult to deny that the international community, now as in the past, is rather the result of designs based upon national interest, aimed at increasing the welfare of the state – or at least of a group of individuals within the state. 

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[1] Botero, G. (1956). The reason of state. New Haven: Yale University Press.

[2] Machiavelli, N. (2005). The prince. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The theory of rational choice and the balance of power for the phenomenology of international alliances

In order to understand the role of the rational choice and balance of power theories in international relations it is useful to consider the world as an anarchical arena in which every state holds full sovereignty and is independent in taking political decisions. Unlike the relations within the state among different political institutions and actors, in the international relations it does not exist a hierarchy of powers nor is there a supreme binding judicial body that may syndicate on the respect of international law or punish the transgressors of it. Let us remember, for instance, that the International Court of Justice can have jurisdiction over a case only if the involved actors agree. In truth, the international relations are the consequence of particularistic and opportunistic considerations oriented toward the augmentation of national prestige, power and welfare.

In this context, the theory of rational choice plays a key role. This theory, albeit borrowed from economics, states within the international relations that an actor attempts to achieve the greatest possible benefit with the lower costs: in other words, it is convenient to do nothing else but pursue the greater good, avoid the greater evil, or at least, to settle for the lesser evil or good.

Economists often apply to the principle of rational choice. The basic idea that upholds the theory is to confront all the costs and benefits of a given activity. Considering an enterprise or a consumer it is a reasonable and rational decision that makes them decide in the former case which outputs to produce and how many of them, and what to purchase according to the own income in the latter. In this sense, the rational decision implies the choice, amongst different available alternatives, of the one that gives a major benefit in relation to the cost. Moreover, in economics rational choices imply the contemplation of marginal costs and marginal benefits, namely the variation of costs and benefits that occur in doing a certain activity in a slightly superior or inferior quantity than a given level: marginal costs/benefits should thus be considered separately from the total costs/benefits of a given activity. Ultimately, we can summarize the idea of rational decision by affirming that it implies the confrontation between marginal benefits and costs: whether the marginal benefit is superior to the marginal cost, then it is rational to start or to expand a certain activity; whether instead it is inferior, it is rational not to begin it or to diminish it.[1] Applying the theory to the theoretical principles of international collaboration, it represents the model through which international alliances and foreign policies choices are conceived and developed. The calculation of the (marginal) costs and benefits of an offensive or defensive alliance, the right granted to foreign troops to transit over a land, the conclusion of trade agreements, and any other form of negotiation wholly rely on realistic and strategic analyzes that see in international interaction a range of opportunities that can be more or less profitable. 

Now, one of the consequences of an international order that applies on equal terms the theory of rational choice is the consolidation of territorial stability following the principles of the balance of power. Wrought by English policymakers and strategists, the principle of the balance of power was typically characteristic of the eighteenth century, and it finally affirmed in the European continent during the nineteenth century after the Restoration. The balance of power is one of the key concepts of realist thought and refers to that condition in which political leaders manage to avoid or suspend the natural propensity to war by mutually fostering a kind of balance that equilibrates their geopolitical weight. This would lead to the making of a stable and ordered international system that could overcome international anarchy.

In order to achieve the balance of power, there are two main strategies, albeit complementary, to implement:

1) Make sure that the power of a stronger political entity, such as an empire, is reduced in order to rebalance its relevance in favor of lesser political entities.

2) Increase the power of the weaker political actor in order to resize the gap of power towards the other actors of the international system with which it interacts.

In practice, these strategies contemplate four different mechanisms aimed at achieving international balance:

1) Divide et impera:  it consists in avoiding the creation of excessively strong coalitions, and in pursuing the annihilation of powerful alliances that either already exist or are being created. The existence of extremely forceful political poles makes it more demanding to conceive counter-balancing strategies.

2) Compensations and territorial partition: this avoids the possibility that a single actor manages to take possession of an excessive quantity of resources and lands, and it helps to compensate the disadvantages that affect the weaker actors of the international system.

3) Dissuasive strategies: consisting in the implementation of policies liable to deter other players of the system from falling prey to greed and lust of conquest, and thus in making choices that can threaten the territorial integrity and survival of the weakest actors, with the risk of unbalancing and altering the international system.

4) Calculated alliances: The aim consists in benefiting from a mechanism that allows fast shifts of the weights, counterweights and powers within the system. This mechanism works best when there is a country that can play the role of balancer for the fact of being in a relatively independent position than other players. The balancer should also be strong enough to be able to intervene in the game of alliances, redistributing the political weights through appropriate choices and in considering mandatory the need of preserving the balance of power.

In fact, these mechanisms require two different tools to find concrete application: war and diplomacy. Moreover, the political entities that are able to implement these strategies are inevitably those who are either already sufficiently mighty to impose their will on others, or those that, having won a war or a military campaign, have gained a political superiority over the others that allows them to dictate their conditions at the negotiations for peace. In the latter case, the relevance of the winner’s will depends on the importance and degree of the attained victory. So, as it is true that winners write history, it is equally true that winners are those that establish a balance of power that is compatible and, where possible, convergent with their geopolitical strategies.[2]

Indeed, the theory of the balance of power entails several problematic issues. Generally, since the objective power of international actors is difficult to evaluate, it is complex to estimate when a system actually reaches the condition of equilibrium of powers. It is also difficult to calculate the effectivity of the ties that bind a coalition, because alliances are as easy to create as to terminate, and thus it could be dangerous to rely on them as guarantors for a state’s security or for the endurance of the system’s equilibrium. Furthermore, the balance of power international arrangement works better only in the case that all the actors of the system possess common norms and values, so that they will be able to appreciate in a comparable condition the common strategies that lead to the systemic equilibrium.

According to Kaplan,[3] the balance of power system is able to work properly only when some minimal conditions occur: the existence of a minimal number of actors, the absence of radical ideological and religious contrasts, the goodwill of the actors to respect the rules that the system implies, and a “providential” intervention of a kind of “invisible hand” that guides the actors’ decision, similar to the one that according to Adam Smith would guide free market.       

In addition, Morgenthau attributes four different meanings to the concept of balance of power based on the emphasis of different aspects related to it: according to the situational aspect, the balance of power is a policy aimed at obtaining a given situation or status quo; for the objective aspect, the balance of power indicates an effective and “real” condition; for the equilibrating aspect, it is a system that tends to reach a homogeneous and equal distribution of power; finally, according to the distributive aspect, balance of power means the presence of a mechanism of power transfer, i.e. an automatic mechanism that generates power redistribution.[4]

At the same time, Wight, the founder of the so-called “English School”, highlights some alternative definitions to the notion of balance of power:[5] the classical definition of balance of power suggests that the international actors share out power in a homogenous fashion; the normative definition considers the balance of power as a general rule that enounces a principle of equilibrium that ought to be uphold in order to grant an optimal function of the system; and an attitudinal definition by which the international system naturally and instinctively tends to establish a balance of power amongst its actors.

Finally, K. Waltz,[6] the chief theorist of neorealism, underlines the structural-systemic origin of the balance of power, highlighting how in an innate anarchical international system the principle of balance of power serves the purpose of self-conserving and self-defending the single actors. In this context, the balance of power is the natural result of the actors’ interaction that operates within the international anarchical system and of the natural competition due to the unequal distribution of power, which undermines global safety. Thus, states generate the balance of power not by their own choice, but because, being programmed to survive, they are naturally compelled to gather with others in a balanced coalition that may face the threat of other similar globally spread coalitions of power. In other words, the balance of power is the meeting point between the need for states to grant their own safety and survival and the will to maintain a “relative advantage” in terms of powerfulness. Practically speaking, states determine their own balance of power both by increasing their inner economic, political and strategic capabilities and by strengthening their systems of alliance and weakening those of the rivals. Waltz believes that since the balance of power is the logic result of the structural anarchic international system, all historical periods and international contests have been characterized by it.        

Historically, the Peace of Lodi (1454) offers the first paradigmatic example of a balance of power system. Likewise, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of Vienna (1815) offer further examples.    

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[1] Sloman, J. (2004). Essentials of economics. Pearson Education Ltd.

[2] Simon-Belli, C. (2002). Teorie delle relazioni internazionali. Perugia: Guerra.

[3] Kaplan, M. (1957). System and process in international politics. New York: Wiley.

[4] Morgenthau, H. (1967). Politics among nations. New York: Knopf.

[5] Wight, M., Bull, H. and Holbraad, C. (1978). Power politics. New York: Holmes & Meier.

[6] Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.

The problem of Justification and Legitimation in non-pluralistic societies

The political theoretical literature often focuses its attention on the dialectics between two core ideas of political thought, the idea of justification and legitimation. At least in principle, the two ideas should be seen as complementary since they should represent two faces of a same coin. However, this is true if we consider the pluralism typical of liberal-democratic societies, in which there can exist different potential justifications in reciprocal conflict but still laying within a common institutional and moral framework that upholds legitimation, especially regarding human rights, civil liberties, intellectual freedom, political diversity, etc. Nevertheless, what would be the case of a non-democratic regime? Would justification and legitimation still be complementary and convergent, at least in moral means, in an authoritarian country? In other words, may legitimation tolerate, or even support, justification in a country where human rights and liberties are challenged or perhaps banned? Additionally, an even more worrisome question could be whether legitimation could be extorted by the political ruling elite that legitimizes its power through a specific justification – an ideology, for instance – through the means of mental manipulation and the thorough use of propaganda for the purposes of fostering consent. The issue is delicate and troublesome, as we can imagine, but to start dealing with it is best to stress the meaning of the words legitimation and justification, as conceived in political theory.

Legitimation represents the way to provide political and institutional legitimacy, which implies an historical and cultural process through which institutions become legitimate in the eyes of a given social group because it connects to them a system of norms, values, customs and behaviours that accepts as valid. Throughout history, the idea of legitimation gave birth to different kind of societies: democratic societies legitimized by the people’s will, revolutionary societies legitimized by an ideology, transcendental societies legitimized by divine right, traditional societies legitimized by hereditary succession, and so on. Today, the liberal-democratic model typical of Western civilization seems to have created at least the spectre of a common worldwide majoritarian form of legitimation that focuses on the respect of basic human rights, tolerance, freedom of thought and rule of law. As we can see, legitimation implies a bottom-up approach, which starts from the subjects to reach the ruling institutions.

On the contrary, justification represents a top-down and subjective substantive, which denies pluralism and other means other than a single one to interpret the world and to discern the truth. Justification is a typical philosophical approach claiming that there is only one correct interpretation of reality and all others are wrong. As we can detect, justification alone is insufficient to create a complete normative conceptual standard, because it also needs legitimation in order to gain social consensus. For instance, some concepts like the forbiddance of murdering or stealing are generally supported by social consensus because they are both justified by political institutions through common sense and legitimized by public opinion. Thus, it is only through the combination of justification and legitimation that a society can develop pluralism. The very idea of pluralism itself is  based upon the idea that there is not a single truth, but many potential truths that may be likewise correct.   

Now, let us imagine living in a country where the political elite and ruling class or party upholds a strong justification that considers as the basis for its legitimacy, but that contrasts in a manifest way some basic standards of justice and equality, and that nonetheless enjoys the legitimation of the majority of its population. In this country, the masses have been politically and culturally indoctrinated by means of propaganda or mental manipulation and thus consider perfectly valid and fair, from a positivistic point of view – albeit not from a naturalistic one – the justification of its political elite. So being things, how can legitimation transform itself into a tool that counterbalances, refines or accomplishes justification if it becomes an instrument subjected to justification? In other terms, is legitimation a still effective parameter to identify pluralism if it has been subordinated and shaped for the purposes of upholding and making cohesive the political justification that leads a society?

Historically speaking, many examples can be quoted. First of all, let us think of the Nazi regime in Germany, a regime supported by a deeply articulated ideology founded on racism and intolerance – the final political output of a European tradition rooted at least already in the 18th century – that profited of a strong popular legitimation due to the spirit of revanchism subsequent to the German defeat in World War One on one hand and to the sophisticated propaganda machine built by the Nazi political elite on the other. Although from a naturalistic point of view, human beings consider as negative and undesirable the idea of discriminating or murdering other human beings, in the Nazi state and satellites the people legitimated the elite’s justification of getting rid, for instance, of the Jews, because the positivistic ideology on which the Nazi legitimacy based was made fair by propaganda and rhetoric. Similarly, the Stalinist conceptual justification based on a violent application of the Leninist-Marxist ideology, which for instance considered as enemies of the people the relatively affluent farmers – the kulaks –, enjoyed the legitimation of the people, which had been extorted by the regime through means of terror and methodical distorted propaganda. Moreover, let us recall the horrible operations of ethnic cleansing in the Balkan region, which repeatedly occurred at least twice during the 20^th century: Serbian chetniks, Croatian ustashas and Bosnian Islamic fundamentalists, just to quote the majoritarian groups of former Yugoslavia, engaged in an unbelievable campaign of mass murdering in the name of religion and territorial hegemony despite belonging to the same ethnic group and speaking a common language. Same considerations can be drawn when considering the Rwandan genocide of 1994, the Turkish genocide of the Armenians during World War One, and, nowadays, the horrible violence perpetrated by the jihadists of the Islamic state against ethnic minorities and other religious groups.

All of the above-mentioned cases – but many more could be quoted – show us treacherously that a political-theoretical justification, even when patently violating the main principles of human rights and pluralism, can somewhat enjoy a legitimation by the people, or at least by an influent group of it, that can transform a totalitarian or one-sided ideology into a valid model advocating a polity. In conclusion, this is why we believe that justification alone cannot be sufficient as a conceptual standard to legitimize a state or regime because it bears a one-way oriented view of the truth and of reality. At the same time, we also reckon that legitimation alone too cannot suffice, because there is a risk that it may be manipulated or extorted by an apparently reasonable ideological justification that hides intolerance or violence. Hence, in order to obtain a naturalistically fair, equal and just polity, we think that justification and legitimation should surely combine, but that this combination should be based upon the principles of pluralism, tolerance, civil liberties and rule of law. If that is not, then the risk is to create political entities careless of naturalistic principles that upkeep only their positivistic, unilateral, view of things, leading directly to tyranny and ferocity.  

         

      

The need for geographical studies and the aid of geography to other sciences according to Mackinder

Back in the year 1887, Sir Halford J. Mackinder published, for the benefit of the Royal Geographical Society, a motivating article entitled On the Scope and Methods of Geography. The issue that Mackinder wished to raise was of fundamental importance for the future and purposes of the very knowledge and teaching of the science of geography. He purely asked himself and his audience what is, in fact, geography and whether it could have been rendered a proper discipline rather than just being a mere body of information. To answer these questions the best thing was primarily to understand which were, and still are, the true scopes and methods of the geographic science. With his article, Mackinder tries to demonstrate that not only geography is a proper discipline, but also it is necessary for the natural evolution and speculation of many others.

Mackinder begins his dissertation describing the role that geographical societies had, especially during the nineteenth century, in actively promoting the exploration of the world. Thanks to the helpful support of these societies, explorers, merchants and travellers had been able to discover, for the profit of all humankind, an increasing number of new lands and countries. The result had been that the world was already almost wholly unveiled, thus becoming a closed geographical – and political – system. When the article appeared, the only lands that needed to be more thoroughly explored were yet the Polar regions, as well as some areas in New Guinea, Central Africa, Central Asia, and in the Tibetan peaks. Being so things, this continuous work of the geographic societies and of the pioneers of world explorations would alone suffice for admitting the value of geographic research and discipline.    

The Royal Geographical Society of London

The second issue that Mackinder rises refers to the nature of geographical studies. He questions whether geography should be considered as one single subject or rather as the addition of several. In other words, should political geography and physical geography be considered as separate or combined? Moreover, should they be considered as self-existing and self-sufficient or merely some appendices of history and geology respectively? Mackinder answers arguing, as other geographers had already stated, that men are the creatures of their environment, and thus people and territory combine into one single, self-sustainable, subject known broadly as geography. This does not mean that within the geographic studies several branches exist, that partition the subject in smaller disciplines: this fact, however, does not interfere with the general acknowledgment of geography as one coherent philosophical and epistemological system. Each sector of the entire geographical scheme deals with a specific matter. For instance, the function of physical geography is to trace the interaction between humankind and natural environment. In fact, it is a specific characteristic of geography to suggest the influence of locality, or best to say, the change of anthropological variations in contact with environmental diversities. If physical geography fails in doing so, then it turns into mere physiography: a sub-subject of geography itself.    

The definition that Mackinder gives to geography is the following: the science whose main function is to depict the interaction of man in society and so much of his environment as varies locally. This explanation allows us to comprehend the general definition that may be given, instead, to geopolitics, that of “expression of political power over landscape”. As we can see, the elements that interact here are two:

1) The varying natural environment.

2) The communities of men that struggle for existence more or less favoured by their several environments.

As for political geography, it cannot exist if it is not built upon and subsequent to physical geography. The function of political geography is to detect and demonstrate how much does the natural environment interfere in forging the destinies of an entire nation or race of human beings, and how relevant it is to understand the strengths and weaknesses of a country. What counts above all else is to stop considering physical geography as a younger sister, if not a maiden, of geology, and political geography of history. Mackinder perceives clearly the huge gap that still lay between the natural and social sciences and suggested that the geographer, being the master of a half-humanistic and half-scientific subject, could build the bridge over such abyss, linking together the two branches of knowledge. As we have seen, geography itself too divides in several sub-categories, though it ought to be studied and considered as a whole. The distinction, in Mackinder’s overview, between geology and geography is that the geologist looks at the present in order to interpret the past, and the geographer looks at the past that he may interpret the present. Physiography asks for a given feature, “Why is it?”; topography, “Where is it?”; physical geography, “Why is it there?”: political geography, “How does it act on man in society, and how does it react on it?”.                           

Howsoever, natural environment is influenced, according to Mackinder, by three elements:

1) The configuration of the earth’s surface.

2) Meteorology and climate.

3) The outputs that countries offer to human industry.

To understand fully how environment affects the history of civilization and political destiny of a race of men, Mackinder offers the example of the influence of England’s south-eastern physical geography in moulding the English historical character. With accurate descriptions, following the historical periods of the Celtic, Roman and Anglo-Saxon rule over Britain, the English geographer exposes exhaustively how geography influences greatly human settlements and history. The results of these geographical studies are that “from a consideration of the folding of the chalk and of his hardness as compared with the strata above and below it, may be demonstrated the causes of the two great promontories, the two great inlets, and the three great upland openings which have determined the positions, the number and the importance of the chief cities [including London] and divisions of South-eastern England”. Indeed, the same methodological approach could be applied for describing any other geographical region and historical evolution.

Geography, Mackinder continues, must benefit of a separate sphere of work from other subjects, although some may closely be linked to it. In fact, all other subjects involved in a geographical reasoning should be analysed in order to understand whether they truly are pertinent to the main line of geographical argument. It is true, however, that the bounds of all sciences must naturally be compromises, especially when considering geography, which includes features belonging to the subjects of geology, palaeontology, zoology, botany, meteorology, anthropology, history, demography and sociology. As Mackinder said, “knowledge is one, but its division into subjects is a concession to human weakness”!

As for the relations of geography with history, the geographer must turn to history for verifying the relations that he suggests. The historian finds full occupation in the critical and comparative study of original documents, having no time – or will – left to scan science for himself with an holistic view to selecting facts and ideas which he requires: and this is, in fact, the geographer’s own duty.  

As above mentioned, environment and community are the two main topics to consider, and to blend, when studying geography. What definitions can we give of them?

- “Environment”: the term means a natural, exclusive and locked, region. The smaller the area included the greater tends to the number of conditions uniform or nearly uniform throughout the area. Thus, we have environments of different orders, whose extension and intension vary inversely.   

- “Community”: the term means a group of men bearing certain characteristics in common. The smaller the community the greater tends to be the number of common characteristics. Community are of different orders and species: races, nations, provinces, towns.

Geography should then question what the effects would be of exposing, for instance, two communities to one environment (think of two different ethnic groups dwelling within the same land) or one community to two environments (think of the English race into the three different environments of Britain, America and Australia). Indeed, everywhere, at all latitudes and in all ages, all political questions will depend as the result of physical-geographical inquiry. It has been shown and demonstrated that certain conditions of climate and soil are needed for the aggregation of dense populations. A certain density of population seems necessary to the development of civilization. Wide plains, for instance, seem especially favourable to the development of homogeneous races, whereas a heterogeneous landscape tends to encourage a variegated racial offspring. The course of history at every given moment, whether in politics and economics or in any other sphere of human activity, is the result of the interaction between natural environment and human society. Furthermore, as to set an example, it has been detected that two environmental conditions favourable to the development of civilisation are somewhat the density of population and the ease of communication, like in the Ganges valley for instance. Of course, a wealthy civilised country is a regional temptation for a conqueror, be it a land or a sea conqueror: this one too is a geographical constant. “Geographical selection”, as interesting as it can be, leads statesmen and peoples to choose the best geographical locations to build harbours, commercial warehouses, cities, metropolises, fortresses, and so forth: it bears exactly the same meaning that “natural selection” enjoys in biology.                

Finally, with this article Mackinder helped the mindful men of his time to render to geography its honourable merit. Its chief value and achievement is its inherent and holistic breadth: “geography satisfies at once the practical requirements of the statesman and merchant, the theoretical requirements of the historian and scientist, and the intellectual requirements of the teacher”. In Mackinder’s final remarks we may read: “Without geography, the student, the scientist and the historian would lose their common platform”. All of this to make understand how important this discipline is.

 

The Royal Geographical Society Circlet

References:

H. J. Mackinder, On the Scope and Methods of Geography, Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography, Vol. 9, No. 3, March 1887.