In order to understand the role of the rational choice and balance of power theories in international relations it is useful to consider the world as an anarchical arena in which every state holds full sovereignty and is independent in taking political decisions. Unlike the relations within the state among different political institutions and actors, in the international relations it does not exist a hierarchy of powers nor is there a supreme binding judicial body that may syndicate on the respect of international law or punish the transgressors of it. Let us remember, for instance, that the International Court of Justice can have jurisdiction over a case only if the involved actors agree. In truth, the international relations are the consequence of particularistic and opportunistic considerations oriented toward the augmentation of national prestige, power and welfare.
In this context, the theory of rational choice plays a
key role. This theory, albeit borrowed from economics, states within the
international relations that an actor attempts to achieve the greatest possible
benefit with the lower costs: in other words, it is convenient to do nothing
else but pursue the greater good, avoid the greater evil, or at least, to
settle for the lesser evil or good.
Economists often apply to the principle of rational
choice. The basic idea that upholds the theory is to confront all the costs and
benefits of a given activity. Considering an enterprise or a consumer it is a
reasonable and rational decision that makes them decide in the former case
which outputs to produce and how many of them, and what to purchase according
to the own income in the latter. In this sense, the rational decision implies
the choice, amongst different available alternatives, of the one that gives a
major benefit in relation to the cost. Moreover, in economics rational choices
imply the contemplation of marginal costs and marginal benefits, namely the
variation of costs and benefits that occur in doing a certain activity in a
slightly superior or inferior quantity than a given level: marginal
costs/benefits should thus be considered separately from the total
costs/benefits of a given activity. Ultimately, we can summarize the idea of
rational decision by affirming that it implies the confrontation between
marginal benefits and costs: whether the marginal benefit is superior to the marginal
cost, then it is rational to start or to expand a certain activity; whether
instead it is inferior, it is rational not to begin it or to diminish it.[1] Applying
the theory to the theoretical principles of international collaboration, it
represents the model through which international alliances and foreign policies
choices are conceived and developed. The calculation of the (marginal) costs
and benefits of an offensive or defensive alliance, the right granted to
foreign troops to transit over a land, the conclusion of trade agreements, and
any other form of negotiation wholly rely on realistic and strategic analyzes
that see in international interaction a range of opportunities that can be more
or less profitable.
Now, one of the consequences of an international order
that applies on equal terms the theory of rational choice is the consolidation
of territorial stability following the principles of the balance of power.
Wrought by English policymakers and strategists, the principle of the balance
of power was typically characteristic of the eighteenth century, and it finally
affirmed in the European continent during the nineteenth century after the
Restoration. The balance of power is one of the key concepts of realist thought
and refers to that condition in which political leaders manage to avoid or
suspend the natural propensity to war by mutually fostering a kind of balance
that equilibrates their geopolitical weight. This would lead to the making of a
stable and ordered international system that could overcome international
anarchy.
In order to achieve the balance of power, there are
two main strategies, albeit complementary, to implement:
1)
Make sure that the power of a stronger political entity, such as an empire, is
reduced in order to rebalance its relevance in favor of lesser political
entities.
2)
Increase the power of the weaker political actor in order to resize the gap of
power towards the other actors of the international system with which it
interacts.
In
practice, these strategies contemplate four different mechanisms aimed at
achieving international balance:
1)
Divide et impera: it consists in
avoiding the creation of excessively strong coalitions, and in pursuing the
annihilation of powerful alliances that either already exist or are being
created. The existence of extremely forceful political poles makes it more
demanding to conceive counter-balancing strategies.
2)
Compensations and territorial partition: this avoids the possibility that a
single actor manages to take possession of an excessive quantity of resources
and lands, and it helps to compensate the disadvantages that affect the weaker
actors of the international system.
3)
Dissuasive strategies: consisting in the implementation of policies liable to
deter other players of the system from falling prey to greed and lust of
conquest, and thus in making choices that can threaten the territorial
integrity and survival of the weakest actors, with the risk of unbalancing and
altering the international system.
4) Calculated alliances: The aim consists in
benefiting from a mechanism that allows fast shifts of the weights,
counterweights and powers within the system. This mechanism works best when
there is a country that can play the role of balancer for the fact of being in
a relatively independent position than other players. The balancer should also
be strong enough to be able to intervene in the game of alliances,
redistributing the political weights through appropriate choices and in
considering mandatory the need of preserving the balance of power.
In fact, these mechanisms require two different tools
to find concrete application: war and diplomacy. Moreover, the political
entities that are able to implement these strategies are inevitably those who
are either already sufficiently mighty to impose their will on others, or those
that, having won a war or a military campaign, have gained a political
superiority over the others that allows them to dictate their conditions at the
negotiations for peace. In the latter case, the relevance of the winner’s will
depends on the importance and degree of the attained victory. So, as it is true
that winners write history, it is equally true that winners are those that
establish a balance of power that is compatible and, where possible, convergent
with their geopolitical strategies.[2]
Indeed, the theory of the balance of power entails
several problematic issues. Generally, since the objective power of
international actors is difficult to evaluate, it is complex to estimate when a
system actually reaches the condition of equilibrium of powers. It is also
difficult to calculate the effectivity of the ties that bind a coalition, because
alliances are as easy to create as to terminate, and thus it could be dangerous
to rely on them as guarantors for a state’s security or for the endurance of
the system’s equilibrium. Furthermore, the balance of power international
arrangement works better only in the case that all the actors of the system possess
common norms and values, so that they will be able to appreciate in a
comparable condition the common strategies that lead to the systemic
equilibrium.
According to Kaplan,[3]
the balance of power system is able to work properly only when some minimal
conditions occur: the existence of a minimal number of actors, the absence of
radical ideological and religious contrasts, the goodwill of the actors to
respect the rules that the system implies, and a “providential” intervention of
a kind of “invisible hand” that guides the actors’ decision, similar to the one
that according to Adam Smith would guide free market.
In addition, Morgenthau attributes four different
meanings to the concept of balance of power based on the emphasis of different
aspects related to it: according to the situational aspect, the balance of
power is a policy aimed at obtaining a given situation or status quo; for the
objective aspect, the balance of power indicates an effective and “real”
condition; for the equilibrating aspect, it is a system that tends to reach a
homogeneous and equal distribution of power; finally, according to the
distributive aspect, balance of power means the presence of a mechanism of
power transfer, i.e. an automatic mechanism that generates power redistribution.[4]
At the same time, Wight, the founder of the so-called
“English School”, highlights some alternative definitions to the notion of
balance of power:[5]
the classical definition of balance of power suggests that the international
actors share out power in a homogenous fashion; the normative definition
considers the balance of power as a general rule that enounces a principle of
equilibrium that ought to be uphold in order to grant an optimal function of
the system; and an attitudinal definition by which the international system
naturally and instinctively tends to establish a balance of power amongst its
actors.
Finally, K. Waltz,[6]
the chief theorist of neorealism, underlines the structural-systemic origin of
the balance of power, highlighting how in an innate anarchical international
system the principle of balance of power serves the purpose of self-conserving
and self-defending the single actors. In this context, the balance of power is
the natural result of the actors’ interaction that operates within the
international anarchical system and of the natural competition due to the
unequal distribution of power, which undermines global safety. Thus, states
generate the balance of power not by their own choice, but because, being
programmed to survive, they are naturally compelled to gather with others in a
balanced coalition that may face the threat of other similar globally spread coalitions
of power. In other words, the balance of power is the meeting point between the
need for states to grant their own safety and survival and the will to maintain
a “relative advantage” in terms of powerfulness. Practically speaking, states
determine their own balance of power both by increasing their inner economic,
political and strategic capabilities and by strengthening their systems of
alliance and weakening those of the rivals. Waltz believes that since the
balance of power is the logic result of the structural anarchic international
system, all historical periods and international contests have been
characterized by it.
Historically,
the Peace of Lodi (1454) offers the first paradigmatic example of a balance of
power system. Likewise, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the Peace of Vienna
(1815) offer further examples.
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